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The Government of Ontario has unveiled the underlying legal 
framework for its cap-and-trade program.  Like the European Union 
Emissions Trading System, the proposed Act places a cap on carbon 
emissions and facilitates the trading of pollution allowances.  The 
ultimate objectives of the Act are to reduce the emission of GHGs, 
while providing financial incentives to businesses. This article 
assesses the proposed Act with respect to the criteria of a robust cap-
and trade system, including: effectiveness; comprehensiveness; 
transparency and fairness; and offset eligibility. 
 
 

































On February 24, 2016, the Province of Ontario in Canada 
introduced the Climate Change Mitigation and Low-carbon Economy 
Act (the “Ontario Climate Act”), and a Cap and Trade Program 
Regulations (the “Regulations”) on February 25, 2016.1 The Act and 
the Regulations, will undergo a 45-day public and stakeholder 
comment period. If passed, this legislation would formally establish a 
cap and trade program in Ontario, adding it to a growing roster of 
municipal, provincial, federal, regional, and international regimes that 
have embraced the cap and trade system as the instrument of choice 
for combating climate change.2 The Ontario Climate Act integrates 
essential precepts of a cap-and trade system with unique governance 
innovations.  The cap-and-trade program is expected to come into 
effect on January 1, 2017.  
A cap and trade program, also known as emission trading, is a 
market-based mechanism to reduce greenhouse gases (GHG), under 
which emitters are provided economic incentives and flexibility to 
achieve GHG reductions. Under this approach, a regulatory body sets 
a cap on the specific annual carbon dioxide levels that the capped 
entities are allowed to emit. 3 Capped entities that emit below their 
annual targets, mainly companies or operators of high emitting 
facilities, can sell unused credits to another participant.  Meanwhile, 
companies that cannot meet their reduction obligations can buy 
carbon credits to offset their emissions.4 In essence, carbon credit is a 
financial instrument that represents the removal of one ton of carbon 
dioxide equivalent (tCO2e) from the atmosphere.5 Therefore, this 
                                                
1 Proposed Climate Change Mitigation and Low-Carbon Economy Act, 2016 (Bill 172) 
<http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/bills/bills_detail.do?locale=en&BillID=3740&detailPage=bills_detail_the_bill> accessed 
March 03, 2016. See also The Cap and Trade Program Regulations, 
<http://www.downloads.ene.gov.on.ca/envision/env_reg/er/documents/2016/012-6837_DraftReg.pdf> accessed March 
03, 2016. 
2 While command and control instruments, such as carbon tax, focus on imposing emission reduction standards/targets 
by an authority that must be complied with, with sanctions resulting from non-compliance, market-based instruments 
include cap-and-trade schemes, offsets schemes or baseline-and-credit schemes that puts a price on GHG emissions 
with the purpose of reducing them. Emission trading schemes have been adopted in 12 jurisdictions across the world. 
These include the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), the Australian Emissions Trading System, the 
New Zealand Emissions Trading System, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the Northeastern United States, the 
California Emissions Trading System, Alberta-Based Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program and Offset Credit System; 
Quebec Cap-and-Trade Scheme; and the Tokyo Emissions Trading System. Others schemes stand on the verge of 
commencing operations, including and the Republic of Korea’s Cap-and-Trade Scheme. Chinese provinces (Hubei and 
Guangdong) and cities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, and Shenzhen) have also proposed Cap-and-Trade 
Schemes. China will by 2017 launch a nationwide cap-and-trade system. 
3 Emissions trading under the international climate regime, as set out in Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, allows 
countries with commitments under the Kyoto Protocol to buy emission units from other countries with commitments 
and use them towards meeting a part of their targets. 
4 Generally, carbon trade is a transaction whereby a buyer purchases, and a seller sells, carbon credits; while carbon 
markets are virtual financial marketplaces where sale and exchange of carbon credits occur. Participants in the carbon 
market, mostly governments and business enterprises, divide carbon credits into commodity units, which are then 
tracked, priced and traded, depending on the participant’s relative capacity and needs vis-à-vis their targets.  For 
detailed examination of the nature and scope of carbon finance, see D Olawuyi, The Human Rights Based Approach to 
Carbon Finance (Cambridge University Press, 2016) 31-32. 
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system aims to provide flexible options for large emitters to reduce 
carbon emissions over time. In theory, this flexibility should decrease 
the overall costs of compliance with emission reduction targets. The 
cap on carbon emissions also incentivizes investment in clean 
technologies, thus facilitating the creation of new jobs and the 
transition to a low-carbon economy.  
The Ontario Climate Act enshrines into law Ontario's 
ambitious plans and targets to achieve 15 percent GHG reduction 
below 1990 levels by 2020, 37 percent below 1990 levels by 2030, 
and 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050.6 It also establishes a 
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Account for deposit of all proceeds from 
Ontario's cap and trade program. Furthermore, based on government 
estimates, Ontario expects to generate approximately $1.8-1.9 billion 
per year in proceeds from the cap and trade program, and will invest 
such proceeds in “programs that reduce greenhouse gas pollution, 
help save families’ money and reward innovative companies by 
creating more opportunities for investment in Ontario.”7 
Ontario’s cap-and-trade program is both ambitious and 
innovative.  By committing to a mid-term target to reduce emissions 
by 37 per cent below 1990 levels by 2030, Ontario became the first 
province in Canada to set a mid-term greenhouse gas pollution 
reduction target for 2030.8 Furthermore, Ontario’s cap and trade 
program innovatively addresses questions on how proceeds of the cap 
and trade program can be sustainably invested and utilized to deliver 
benefits to Ontarians, It establishes a finance mechanism through 
which proceeds from the program can be reinvested to alleviate social 
and environmental problems in Ontario.  The Government of Ontario 
has already created a $325-million Green Investment Fund that will 
commit to projects that will fight climate change, grow the economy 
and create jobs.9  This Fund, if effectively administered, provides 
realistic and long-term strategies to combine emission reduction goals 
with economic and social development programs such as public and 
green transportation; renewable energy; retrofits to improve energy 
                                                                                                                                                            
on carbon markets. See D Olawuyi, The Human Rights Based Approach to Carbon Finance, ibid.  
6 See L Goldstein, “Cap-and-trade: The next Liberal rip-off” (Toronto Sun, February 25, 2016) < 
http://www.torontosun.com/2016/02/25/cap-and-trade-the-next-liberal-rip-off> stating that  “The plan repeats almost 
every blunder made by Europe’s decade-old cap-and-trade market, the Emissions Trading Scheme, unsurprising given 
the Liberals consulted with ETS bureaucrats in drafting their plan.” See also K Libin, “Ontario’s new cap-and-trade 
plan is a tawdry tax-and-spend scheme sold as a gift of ‘clean air for our children” (Financial Post, February 25, 2016) 
<http://business.financialpost.com/fp-comment/kevin-libin-ontarios-new-cap-and-trade-plan-is-a-tawdry-tax-and-
spend-scheme-sold-as-a-gift-of-clean-air-for-our-children> accessed February 25, 2016, stating that “The truly 
surprising thing about the new Ontario cap-and-trade emissions regime isn’t that, when so many layers of feel-good 
enviro-coddling spin is stripped away, it’s ultimately designed to suck what could amount to hundreds of dollars from 
families’ pockets and funnel it into a big slush pile for the Liberals to then sprinkle treats over favored sectors. The real 
marvel is that it took them this long to land on the scheme.” 
7 See “Ontario Introduces New Climate Change Legislation” 
 < https://news.ontario.ca/ene/en/2016/02/ontario-introduces-new-climate-change-legislation.html> accessed February 
25, 2016.  
8 See Government of Ontario, “Ontario First Province in Canada to Set 2030 Greenhouse Gas Pollution Reduction 
Target: New Target Builds Momentum Toward a Low-Carbon Economy” 
https://news.ontario.ca/ene/en/2015/05/ontario-first-province-in-canada-to-set-2030-greenhouse-gas-pollution-
reduction-target.html> accessed April 02, 2016. 
9 Government of Ontario, Green Investment Fund, <https://www.ontario.ca/page/green-investment-fund> accessed 
March 03, 2016. 
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efficiency in homes, buildings and businesses; clean technologies and 
energy efficiency projects that reduce greenhouse gases while 
creating jobs.   This holistic approach has delivered positive prospects 
in countries such as Romania, where proceeds of carbon credits have 
been utilized for social development programs.10 
Furthermore, as Canada’s most populous province, home to 
nearly 50 percent of all Canadians, it is imperative for Ontario to lead 
effective climate action in order for Canada to achieve its Intended 
Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) to reduce GHG 
emissions economy-wide by 30% below 2005 levels by 2030.11  
Ontario’s proposed program is a positive effort that, if effectively 
implemented, could influence and inform Canada’s future climate 
action.  
Despite its innovative approach however, the proposed Act 
has already received flak from commentators who consider the 
proposed legislation as less of a carbon-reduction plan than a public 
rip-off, a “feel-good enviro-coddling spin,” and a false start to climate 
change action.12 Many of the early criticisms and concerns regarding 
the Ontario Climate Act relate to wider debates on whether a cap and 
trade instrument, as opposed to carbon taxation, represents the most 
effective legal instrument choice for combating climate change; 
whether a cap and trade regime can deliver real, measurable, 
additional, long term and sustainable reduction of GHGs; whether a 
cap and trade program immorally rewards the polluter and allows 
trade in hot air; and whether a cap and trade program will not result in 
social, economic and human rights problems for the public. These 
debates have been extensively considered in the literature and will not 
be rehashed in this article.13 Rather, the aim of this article is to 
                                                
10 In 2013-2014, Romania generated about 260 million Euros, and are hoping to raise another about 2 billion Euros 
during the 2016-2020 period, from the country’s cap-and-trade program. The proceeds have been used to construct new 
bike lanes and metro stations. See The World Bank, New bike lanes and metro stations in Bucharest paid for by carbon 
credits <http://blogs.worldbank.org/climatechange/new-bike-lanes-and-metro-stations-bucharest-paid-carbon-credits> 
accessed March 03, 2016. 
11 The Government of Canada submitted its intended nationally determined contribution (INDC) to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Secretariat in May 2015.  Canada intends to reduce greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions economy-wide by 30% below 2005 levels by 2030. See Canada’s INDC Submission to the 
UNFCCC,  
<http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Canada/1/INDC%20-%20Canada%20-
%20English.pdf> > accessed March 03, 2016. 
12 See L Goldstein, “Cap-and-trade: The next Liberal rip-off” (Toronto Sun, February 25, 2016)  
<http://www.torontosun.com/2016/02/25/cap-and-trade-the-next-liberal-rip-off> sting that  “The plan repeats almost 
every blunder made by Europe’s decade-old cap-and-trade market, the Emissions Trading Scheme, unsurprising given 
the Liberals consulted with ETS bureaucrats in drafting their plan.” See also K Libin, “Ontario’s new cap-and-trade 
plan is a tawdry tax-and-spend scheme sold as a gift of ‘clean air for our children” 
<http://business.financialpost.com/fp-comment/kevin-libin-ontarios-new-cap-and-trade-plan-is-a-tawdry-tax-and-
spend-scheme-sold-as-a-gift-of-clean-air-for-our-children> accessed February 25, 2016, stating that “The truly 
surprising thing about the new Ontario cap-and-trade emissions regime isn’t that, when so many layers of feel-good 
enviro-coddling spin is stripped away, it’s ultimately designed to suck what could amount to hundreds of dollars from 
families’ pockets and funnel it into a big slush pile for the Liberals to then sprinkle treats over favoured sectors. The 
real marvel is that it took them this long to land on the scheme.” 
13 See T Alton, “Introducing Carbon Taxes in South Africa” (2014) 116(1) Applied Energy, 344-354; D Olawuyi 
“Rethinking the Place of Flexible Mechanisms in Kyoto's Post 2012 Commitments” (2010) Journal of Law, 
Environment and Development 23-35; also M Sandel, Editorial, ‘It’s Immoral to Buy the Right to Pollute’, 
N.Y.TIMES, 15 December 1997, page A23. See also, T. Jackson, K. Begg, S. Parkinson , ‘The Language of Flexibility 
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evaluate the scope and content of the Ontario Climate Act with 
respect to some essential criteria of a robust cap-and trade system, 
including: effectiveness; comprehensiveness; transparency and 
fairness; and offset eligibility.  
  This article assesses the potentials and pitfalls of the 
Ontario Climate Act. It identifies its areas of innovation and 
strengths, key implementation and logistical questions that may arise, 
and offers perspectives on how to address such gaps.  
 
Evaluation of the Ontario Climate Act 
 
The essential normative requirements for assessing the 
environmental integrity of a cap-and trade system include: 
effectiveness; comprehensiveness; transparency and fairness; and 
offset eligibility.14 This section evaluates Ontario’s proposed 
legislation in the light of these key requirements. It aims to determine 
whether the Ontario Climate Act, in its current form, can potentially 
deliver measurable long term and sustainable reduction of GHGs in 
Ontario. 
A. Effectiveness 
An ex-ante evaluation of the effectiveness of a cap and trade 
program focuses on the stringency of targets set by the program and 
on whether the scope of the regulated GHG sources are extensive 
enough to drive GHG abatement from key sources.15 Therefore, the 
first point to address is whether the Ontario emission trading scheme 
adequately regulates major emission sources. The Ontario Climate 
Act in Section 1 establishes a verifiable emissions amount and sets a 
deadline within which capped entities must submit their emission 
allowances and credits, following the end of the compliance period in 
Section 5. The compliance period is stated in section 2 as January 1, 
2017 to December 31, 2020, January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2023, 
and each subsequent three-year period. Section 4 describes the cost 
equivalent per tonne of reductions.  The cap will decline by 3.7 
percent over each subsequent three year-period, falling to 15 per cent 
below 1990 levels by 2020. 
The Act is sweeping in its coverage of emission sources. The 
definition of ‘prescribed activity’ in Section 3 includes all key sectors 
                                                
14 See A Radu, “Alberta's CO2 Reduction Strategy – Assessing the Environmental Integrity of Emissions Trading 
Schemes” (Canadian Institute of Resources Law 2014) 7-11 
<http://dspace.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/1880/50352/1/EmissionsOP45w.pdf > accessed March 03, 2016; see also Misato 
Sato, .Tim Laing, Simone Cooper, & Lixiang Wang, “Methods for Evaluating the Performance of Emissions Trading 
Schemes” (November 2015) http://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/CS-ChinaETS-Evaluation-paper-
final1.pdf;  World Bank, Mapping Carbon Pricing Initiatives: Developments and Prospects (Washington DC: World 
Bank, 2013); J Arlinghaus, “Impacts of Carbon Prices on Indicators of Competitiveness. Empirical Findings” 
(OECD Environment working papers No. 87, 2015); C Munnings, R Morgenstern, Z Wang, and X Liu “Assessing the 
Design of Three Pilot Programs for Carbon Trading in China” (October 2014) 
<http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-14-36.pdf> accessed April 3, 2016; J Coria, A 
Lofgren, and T Sterner, “To trade or not to trade: Firm-level Analysis of Emissions Trading in Santiago, Chile” (2010) 
91(11) Journal of Environmental Management 2126- 2133. 
15 See Radu, ibid at 24, also C Munnings, R Morgenstern, Z Wang, and X Liu, “Assessing the Design of Three Pilot 
Programs for Carbon Trading in China”, ibid at 4. 
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with high historical emissions of GHGs that are already subject to 
Ontario’s greenhouse gas emissions reporting regulation (the 
“Reporting Regulation”).16  Section 14 (2) of the proposed Ontario 
Climate Act stipulates that any entity required by the Reporting 
Regulation to submit a report and verification statement in 2016 is a 
mandatory participant under the proposed cap-and-trade program.  
This covers a wide range of sectors across agriculture, electricity 
generation, iron and steel production, natural gas distribution and 
petroleum product supply. 
Furthermore, in order to avoid a flood of business-as-usual 
allowances, Section 6 restricts emission allowances that may be 
submitted for a compliance period. They are allowances transferred 
into a compliance account as a result of a successful purchase of 
emission allowances offered for sale, and Ontario’s annual emission 
allowances classified by the Minister as generated in the compliance 
period or an earlier year or within the first or second year following 
the end of the compliance period. Furthermore, the Act elaborates 
types of initiatives that may be funded from proceeds of the cap and 
trade program, of which concern energy use, land use and buildings, 
infrastructure, transportation, industry, agriculture and forestry, waste 
management, education and training, and research and innovation. 
By extending its reach to a wide range of activities and 
sectors, the proposed Ontario Climate Act arguably meets the 
requirement of effectiveness and has strong potentials to adequately 
regulate key emission sources in Ontario. 
B. Comprehensiveness 
A sustainable emission-trading scheme must identify and 
encapsulate all sources of GHG emissions.  As Radu rightly 
notes,“the extent to which the particular ETS covers sources of 
emissions and emission gases is a measure of the comprehensiveness 
of the ETS.”17 Furthermore, as the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) recommends in its Guidelines for Compiling 
GHG Inventories that methodologies for estimating, assembling, 
documenting, and transmitting GHG inventory data must be 
consistent and comprehensive, regardless of the method used to 
produce the estimates.18 
The proposed Ontario Climate Act identifies two types of 
eligible GHG emissions: CO2 and non-CO2 emissions. However, the 
Act fails to include a comprehensive list of gases that come under the 
non-CO2 emissions. The Act references methane (CH4) and nitrous 
oxide (N2O), but fails to mention the wide array of other GHGs that 
have also been identified by the IPCC as contributors to climate 
change. These include hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs); perfluorocarbons 
(PFCs); sulphur hexafluoride (SF6); nitrogen trifluoride (NF3); 
                                                
16 See Section 5 of Ontario’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reporting Regulation, Reg. 452/09, under the Environmental 
Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19.  A person who owns or operates a facility at which GHG emitting activities, that 
are comprehensively listed in Table 2 of the Reporting Regulation, occurs is required to quantify and report GHG 
emissions associated with those activities as applicable under the Regulation.  
17 Ibid at 9.  
18 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas 
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trifluoromethyl sulphur pentafluoride (SF5CF3); halogenated ethers; 
and halocarbons not covered by the Montreal Protocol including 
CF3I, CH2Br2 CHCl3.19   
By failing to create a comprehensive list of non-CO2 gases to 
be capped and regulated, the proposed Ontario Climate Act falls into 
the trap of non-specificity, a gap that could pose long-term 
implementation challenges.  One way of ensuring specificity is for the 
Act to reference the comprehensive list of GHGs contained in the 
Reporting Regulation, some of which are also included in Canada’s 
INDC.20 
 
C. Transparency and Fairness  
A robust cap-and-trade system must adopt transparent 
mechanisms for creating emission allowances, setting price caps, and 
distributing emission allowances through auction. Transparency 
requires that the “rules of the game” are clarified in a fair and open 
manner. The Ontario Climate Act, arguably, incorporates robust 
mechanisms that, if effectively implemented, could help ensure 
transparency.  
Section 34 of the Act sets a reasonable number of Ontario 
emission allowances that the Minister for Environment and Climate 
Change will create each year: 
Year Number of Allowance 
(tonnes – units?) 
2017 142,332,000  
2018 136,440,000 
2019 130,556,000  
2020 124,668,000 
 
In Section 35, the Minister granted the power to reserve and 
sell five percent (5%) of all Ontario emission allowances created. 
Section 36 allows the Minister to auction submitted and reserved 
emission allowances. To provide fair and adequate notices to 
participants, Section 38 provides that the Minister shall provide notice 
of an auction or sale to the public.  The minister must also provide 
information on the date, time, location, process, and requirements of 
the auction or sale. 
Section 42 requires the Minister to make a written summary of 
each auction or sale available to the public within 45 days following 
its conclusion,. This summary sets out key information such as the 
lowest bid price accepted, registered participants who submitted bids 
in the auction or sale, details regarding the number of emission 
allowances sold, the number of emission allowances sold for each 
vintage year or category, and a description of how the emission 
                                                
19 Ibid. 
20 See Table 1 of the Reporting Regulation, see also ‘Gases Covered’ in Canada’s INDC Submission to the UNFCCC, 
supra note 10.  
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allowances were distributed among the bidders, without identifying 
the participants. 
By incorporating provisions ensuring that clear and detailed 
information on market activities and transactions are transparently 
disclosed, the Ontario Climate Act has the potential to stimulate trust 
and protect access to information rights. 
D. Offset eligibility 
Flexibility is very important in combating climate change. By 
allowing participants to utilize international credits generated by 
project-based mechanisms – such as the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM and 
its Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism – toward fulfilling part of 
their domestic obligations, emission reduction schemes can provide 
opportunities for participants to achieve emission reduction at the 
least possible cost. Section 7 of the Ontario Climate Act provides that 
offset credits may be submitted for a compliance period. In order to 
create a robust offset credit program in Ontario, it is envisaged that 
separate offsets regulation will be proposed later in 2016 if the 
climate change legislation passes. According to the Ontario Climate 
Act, the offsets regulation will describe the required conditions which 
must meet to be able to create, verify and register offset credits for 
use in Ontario’s greenhouse gas cap and trade program, including 
requirements for protocols. Protocols set out the requirements to 
demonstrate the offset criteria such as ownership, and that proposed 
offsets are real, additional, verified, unique, permanent, and 
enforceable, to ensure that offset projects produce the emission 
reductions claimed. 
In designing offset regulations, it is important to adopt a 
lessons-learned approach that draws on some of the implementation 
challenges facing offset mechanisms seen on the international level 
with the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Studies show that 
failure to introduce human rights safeguards in carbon actions and 
projects may exacerbate human rights violations and create complex 
challenges and risks for a cap-and-trade system.21 It is particularly 
important to consider how allegations of forceful land grabs, violation 
of human rights, siting and concentration of projects in poor 
communities, and lack of accountability by project participants, have 
stifled the overall efficacy of the CDM. These precedents should 
provide some useful lessons. New international policy recognizes the 
importance of these considerations.  For instance, the Paris 
Agreement states the following in its preamble: 
Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, 
promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, 
the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local 
communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people 
in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as 
                                                
21 See D Olawuyi, The Human Rights Based Approach to Carbon Finance, supra note 4.  See also  
D Olawuyi, Climate Justice and Corporate Responsibility: Taking Human Rights 
Seriously in Climate Actions and Projects (2016) 34: 1 JOURNAL OF ENERGY & NATURAL 
RESOURCES LAW, 1-18; United Nations Environment Program, Climate Change and Human Rights (UNEP 2015) 9-
10; and International Bar Association, Climate Change Justice and Human Rights Task Force Report, Achieving Justice 
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The Ontario Climate Act is timely, comprehensive and 
positive legislation with far more strengths than weaknesses. Coming 
at a time when the world is looking to hold the increase in the global 
average temperature well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and 
1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, the proposed legislation provides a 
new impetus for a dynamic carbon market that can stimulate 
significant progress, heralding a new dawn in achieving this goal. 
The efficacy of the proposed legislation can be further 
improved if it is infused with procedural and accountability 
safeguards to address human rights risks and concerns that will 
inevitably arise in carbon offset projects. The legislation, and its 
accompanying regulations, should establish inspection panels and a 
dispute resolution mechanism through which emission reduction 
actions and projects that violate existing environmental and human 
rights laws can be identified and screened out from credit trading. 
                                                
22 Emphasis added. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), The Paris Agreement, 
Conference of the Parties, Twenty-first Session Paris, 30 November to 11 December 2015, 
<https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf> accessed February 25, 2016. 
 
